This book provides an in-depth look at legal, economic and political issues related to safeguards in the WTO system. This is a close examination of the history of safeguards under the GATT and the opening of the agreement on safeguard measures during the Uruguay Round. It examines economic arguments for and against protection measures, including the presentation of the modern political economy of safeguard measures and “leak clauses” in international agreements. The following chapters focus on the main legal issues related to the application of safeguard measures, including procedural rules, the obligation to demonstrate unforeseen developments and increased imports, the notion of “serious harm,” the enigmatic causation test and the limitation of the scope of safeguard measures, including the principles of non-discrimination. All protection decisions made under the WTO system are carefully dissected and analysed. The annexes include the text of the treaty and relevant national legislation from the United States and the European Union. Article 1 provides that the SG agreement is the instrument for applying the measures provided for in Article XIX of the GATT of 1994. In other words, any measure for which the scope of Article XIX (which allows the suspension of GATT concessions and obligations in defined emergency situations) must be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on the General Protection Enterprise. The agreement does not expressly apply to measures taken under other provisions of the 1994 GATT, to other annex 1A multilateral trade agreements, or to protocols and agreements or agreements concluded under the 1994 GATT. (s.
11.1 (c) c) This agreement does not apply to measures requested, concluded or maintained by a member in accordance with the 1994 GATT provisions, unlike Article XIX and the multilateral trade agreements in Schedule 1A that are not this agreement, or on the basis of protocols and agreements or agreements concluded under the 1994 GATT. When applying a safeguard measure, the member must maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations to the exporting members concerned. In this regard, appropriate means of compensation can be agreed with the members concerned. In the absence of such an agreement, the exporting members concerned may individually suspend substantially equivalent concessions and other obligations. The latter right cannot be exercised during the first three years of a safeguard measure if the measure is taken on the basis of an absolute increase in imports and is in line with the provisions of the agreement by other means. Most protection agreements are comprehensive safeguard agreements concluded by the IAEA with non-nuclear-weapon States, parties to the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zones agreements.